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ABSTRACT 
This paper provides a critical assessment of the “Feasibility study concerning the actual 
implementation of a joint cross-border procurement procedure by public buyers from different 
Member States” prepared by BBG-SKI for the European Commission. The paper submits that the 
study provides some interesting data and details about relevant case studies, but that it does 
not shed significant light on the doubts created by the rules on joint cross-border public 
procurement (JCBPP) in the 2014 EU Public Procurement Package, and that the main weakness 
of the study is its lack of a general legal analytical framework. 
In order to gain additional legal insights on the basis of the empirical data included in the BBG-
SKI study, this paper proposes an analytical framework under which to assess the legal 
compliance of JCBPP structures. It then summarises each of the case studies included in the 
BBG-SKI study and offers a critical (re)assessment of the issues that would have required more 
information and/or which are insufficiently analysed in the BBG-SKI study. Based on this 
reorganised empirical evidence, the paper proceeds to a critical assessment of some of the 
outstanding legal barriers and challenges to JCBPP. It concludes by stressing some of the 
remaining uncertainties concerning legal development at Member State level, and calls on the 
European Commission to facilitate more detailed research leading to the adoption of future 
guidance on JCBPP under the 2014 EU Public Procurement Directives. 
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1. Introduction 
The European Commission remains committed to its policy of facilitating and promoting cross-
border collaborative public procurement in the EU as part of the Strategy for a deeper and fairer 
single market,2 broadly understood.3 On 20 March 2017, and as an effort to support innovative 
projects of collaborative procurement with a cross-border dimension, the European 
Commission published the BBG-SKI study.4 The study had the goal of assessing the feasibility of 
the possible implementation of joint cross-border public procurement (JCBPP), in particular 
focusing on the legal, administrative and organisational aspects of four selected projects.5 The 
BBG-SKI study was thus expected to shed light on the complex legal issues that JCBPP raises,6 
and to provide insights on the ways in which Arts 37 to 39 of Directive 2014/247—and their 
equivalent Arts 55 to 57 of Directive 2014/258—can be transposed and developed by the 
Member States to facilitate the uptake of JCBPP. 
The BBG-SKI study offers some interesting information on four JCBPP projects carried out before 
the implementation of the 2014 EU Public Procurement Directives was effective in the relevant 
Member States. Three of the case studies involve cross-border collaboration between, or 
involving central purchasing bodies (CPBs), and the other one focuses on cross-border 
procurement by an entity jointly created by two Member States to channel their cooperation in 
an infrastructure project of EU interest. The BBG-SKI study allows for empirical evidence of the 
legal difficulties created by JCBPP to start to emerge and sketches the legal solutions trialled in 
those projects by the contracting authorities concerned—which are generally creative and 
worthy of detailed analysis.  
However, the BBG-SKI study does not subject those legal structures to a systematic or critical 
assessment and remains extremely shallow in its legal analysis, to the point of making empty 
general statements such as “JCBPP is more a matter of legal complexity than of legal barriers”,9 
or that “from a legal point of view JCBPP initiatives are not necessarily only a risky endeavour, 
                                                          
2 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic 
and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, Upgrading the Single Market: more 
opportunities for people and business, COM(2015) 550 final. Available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/DocsRoom/documents/14007?locale=en, last accessed 31.03.2017. 
3 See the current European Commission’s Public Procurement Strategy, including its focus on facilitating 
the aggregation of demand, at https://ec.europa.eu/growth/single-market/public-
procurement/strategy_en, last accessed 31.03.2017. 
4 BBG – SKI, Feasibility study concerning the actual implementation of a joint cross-border procurement 
procedure by public buyers from different Member States, December 2016. Available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/DocsRoom/documents/22102/, last accessed 29.03.2017. 
5 BBG-SKI study, 9. 
6 For discussion and a mapping of the main issues, see A Sanchez-Graells, “Collaborative Cross-Border 
Procurement in the EU: Future or Utopia?” (2016) 3(1) Upphandlingsrättslig Tidskrift 11-37, available at 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2734123, last accessed 29.03.2017. See also T Tátrai, “Joint public 
procurement” (2015) 16(1) ERA Forum 7-24; and S Ponzio, “Joint Procurement and Innovation in the New 
EU Directive and in Some EU-Funded Projects” (2014) 2 Ius Publicum, art 7, available at http://www.ius-
publicum.com/repository/uploads/20_03_2015_13_12-Ponzio_IusPub_JointProc_def.pdf, last accessed 
29.03.2017. 
7 Directive 2014/24/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 February 2014 on public 
procurement and repealing Directive 2004/18/EC [2014] OJ L 94/65. 
8 Directive 2014/25/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 February 2014 on 
procurement by entities operating in the water, energy, transport and postal services sectors and 
repealing Directive 2004/17/EC [2014] OJ L 94/243. 
9 BBG-SKI study, 104. 
3 
but also open up opportunities for achieving the goal of enhancing efficiency in public 
procurement” (sic).10 This is a lost opportunity for the European Commission to have provided 
clarification of the new and complex rules on JCBPP in the 2014 EU Public Procurement Package. 
In my opinion, the BBG-SKI study’s main shortcoming is its lack of a general legal analytical 
framework under which the different case studies can be assessed. This makes the information 
on the legal aspects of the projects it discusses appear scattered throughout the report and, 
ultimately, makes its analytical attempts fall rather short of identifying relevant unresolved legal 
issues or doubtful legal strategies—which, despite having been used in the specific case studies, 
are not checked for compliance with EU law or the domestic law of the relevant Member States, 
nor for their fit with the JCBPP models that the 2014 EU Directives have created,11 which they 
are simply assumed to match.12 
I find it rather telling, and disappointing, that one of the final conclusions in the study stresses 
that “[a]ll in all, legal uncertainties did not in any case render the JCBPP procedure as such 
impossible, but rather led to a number of adjustments and accompanying measures”.13 
However, there is no hard assessment of whether those adjustments and accompanying 
measures were legally compliant or solely commercially tolerable (or tolerated). Indeed, upon 
reading the BGG-SKI study, the only conclusion that can be extracted with certainty from a legal 
perspective is that, given that none of these procedures were challenged in court, these legal 
structures cannot be seen to represent more than exercises of JCBPP that were commercially 
tolerated by the market—sometimes not without commercial reluctance or resistance, though. 
That is, from a pragmatic perspective, it can be stressed that all case studies showcase legal 
strategies that the respective contracting authorities managed to implement in practice. 
However, the deeper question of whether these strategies ensured JCBPP’s (full) legal 
compliance under the specific circumstances of each case remains uncharted territory. Thus, it 
is also hard to see how those legal strategies and structures could be generalised for contracting 
authorities of those or other Member States. The BGG-SKI study does not, in my view, 
significantly further our understanding of the determinants of legal compliance of JCBPP. 
In order to go beyond this situation and to gain some additional insights on the basis of the 
empirical data included in the BBG-SKI study, this paper proposes an analytical framework under 
which to assess the legal compliance of JCBPP structures (2). It then summarises each of the 
case studies included in the BBG-SKI study and offers a critical (re)assessment of the issues that 
would have required more information and/or which are insufficiently analysed in the BBG-SKI 
study (3). Based on this reorganised empirical evidence, the paper proceeds to a critical 
assessment of some of the existing legal barriers and challenges to JCBPP (4). It concludes by 
stressing some of the remaining uncertainties concerning legal development at Member State 
level, and calls on the European Commission to facilitate more detailed research leading to the 
adoption of future guidance on JCBPP under the 2014 EU Public Procurement Directives (5). 
                                                          
10 BBG-SKI study, 111. 
11 For a limited attempt in that regard, see BBG-SKI study, 109-111. 
12 Indeed, the study simply indicates that “[w]ith a view to the typologies of JCBPP which the EU 
Procurement Directives lay out, the cases at hand illustrate some of the main forms of mechanisms for 
joint procurement: JCBPP with two or more CAs from different Member States jointly conducting a 
procurement procedure, including also CPBs jointly acting as CAs, and cross-border procurement through 
a joint entity”; BBG-SKI study, 107, footnotes omitted. 
13 BBG-SKI study, 106. 
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2. An Analytical Framework to Assess JCBPP’s Legal Compliance 
Given the legal complexities of this type of procurement projects, I submit that it is useful (if not 
indispensable) to have a general analytical framework under which to assess JCBPP’s legal 
compliance. In that regard, it is worth stressing that the case studies largely fit in the theoretical 
case scenarios I developed elsewhere.14 Those models structure the complex sets of legal 
relationships around (i) the relationship between the cooperating entities15 based in different 
Member States, be they CPBs or not (ii) the relationships between the contracting entity and 
the bidders created by the tender, (iii) the relationship between the contracting entity and the 
contractor(s), which can also imply a parallel or dependent relationship between the final users 
and the contractor(s) in the case of eg framework agreements tendered by CPBs, and (iv) the 
relationship between the CPB and the end users, where this exists. All of these relationships 
require a legal assessment, both from a substantive and a jurisdictional perspective.  
Based on this abstract blueprint for analysis and setting other issues aside (such as tax law, 
budgetary law, etc)—from an (international) public law and public procurement perspective—
the main issues that require detailed assessment in order to ensure JCBPP’s legal compliance 
concern the following dimensions: 
(1) Legal framework dimension: international and domestic public law dimension of the 
collaborative relationship established between the contracting entities (be they CPBs or 
not), which can be complicated if the collaborating entities resort to private law 
mechanisms that may or not circumvent those (international) public law requirements 
(including constitutional issues), and the related issues of jurisdiction (or lack thereof); 
(2) Public procurement dimension: which concentrates on the potential conflict of public 
laws regulating the procurement process and procurement remedies, including issues 
of conflicting or overlapping jurisdiction; and 
(3) Contractual dimension: which concentrates on the potential conflict of (public or 
private) contract law applicable to the execution of the contract, including issues of 
jurisdiction (or alternative dispute resolution mechanisms). 
There are some additional dimensions, such as (4) compliance with relevant rules in the 
relationships between end-user entities and CPBs where the JCBPP involves the participation of 
the latter, or (5) relationships between contractors and CPBs where there are rebates or other 
types of mechanisms that involve the transfer (back) of funds as a mechanism to finance the 
activities of the CPB. However, given the scant attention paid to these dimensions in the BGG-
SKI study, this paper will not develop them any further. The next section will summarise, reorder 
and reassess the case studies in the BBG-SKI study around the three dimensions identified 
above. Section 4 will later engage in a more general assessment of some legal barriers and 
challenges for legally-compliant JCBPP under the 2014 EU Public Procurement Package. 
 
 
                                                          
14 Sanchez-Graells (n 6) section 2. 
15 Cooperating or contracting entities is used loosely in this paper, to cover any entity covered by EU public 
procurement rules. It will thus encompass both contracting authorities and contracting entities, 
depending on the specific circumstances of the case. 
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3. A (Re)Assessment of the Case Studies in the BBG-SKI Study 
This section provides summaries and a critical (re)assessment of the case studies developed in 
the BBG-SKI study in line with the three dimensions identified above (2). It aims to provide a 
legally-centric account of each of the case studies and concentrates on legal implications of the 
different project structures. Remarks on their commercial or economic viability will only be 
made where relevant for the legal assessment. 
 
3.1. The EPCO Case Study 
The EPCO case study concentrates on the procurement of standard IT software packages 
through a reseller. The procurement was instrumented through a framework agreement 
tendered under Dutch law (both for the procurement and for the contract) and in English 
language, which subjected disputes to the jurisdiction of the competent court in Amsterdam 
both for procurement and contractual issues, although the parties were free to subject 
contractual disputes to arbitration or mediation by mutual agreement. The procurement was 
run by the Dutch central bank as leading procurer, playing “a similar role to that of a CPB under 
the coordination of EPCO”, and central banks from other Member States could use the structure 
if they so wished. 
The structure of the procurement can be represented as follows: 
 
 
In terms of the rules in Art 39(2) and (3) of Dir 2014/24 (which did not apply at the time), this is 
a close example of what can be considered cross-border use the services of a (sui generis) 
foreign CPB. However, there are a few specificities of the EPCO regime that could point out 
towards this being an example closer to the creation of a joint entity under Art 39(5) Dir 
2014/24. Either way, the example needs to be considered in its own terms and bearing in mind 
important specificities in the legal structure and mandate of EPCO. 
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3.1.1. Legal framework dimension 
This is an interesting case study because it concentrates on what is possibly the most advanced 
legal structure for the conduct of JCBPP in the EU. Since 2008, central banks participating in the 
Eurosystem have benefitted from the existence of the Eurosystem Procurement Coordination 
Office (EPCO),16 which aims to use the synergies of the different central banks in order to achieve 
best value for money in the procurement of goods and services to comply with the principles of 
cost efficiency and effectiveness. EPCO was created by Decision ECB/2008/17 of the Governing 
Council of the European Central Bank establishing the framework for joint Eurosystem 
procurement,17 and its legal framework was recently updated by Decision ECB/2015/51.18 As 
the BBG-SKI study echoes, “EPCO defines itself as sui generis central purchasing body”. 
Indeed, in this case study, there are two very important circumstances that significantly mitigate 
issues around the existence of an international public law framework for the conduct of the 
procurement procedure: (1) the existence of an EU-wide legal framework derived from Decision 
ECB/2008/17; and (2) the on-going support of the lead central bank by EPCO as sui generis 
central purchasing body. 
3.1.2. Public procurement and contractual dimensions 
It is important to stress that the procedure was designed to avoid the existence of international 
choice of law issues by subjecting all legal aspects (ie both procurement and contract execution) 
to Dutch law, as a matter of principle. However, the extent to which this sorted out all existing 
legal issues cannot be assessed on the basis of the information provided by the BBG-SKI study 
and more detail would have been necessary for a definitive evaluation. 
First, the potential existence of procurement law restrictions for the participation of central 
banks of other Member States on this specific type of JCBPP led by the Dutch bank and EPCO is, 
at least in part, mitigated by the existence of the EU-level framework of Decision ECB/2008/17, 
as well as by the specificities of the way in which BBG-SKI designed the data collection. The study 
only contains information on two Member States included in the assessment (Austria and 
Luxembourg), in addition to the lead bank (Netherlands). This is very relevant because the legal 
structure centred in the Dutch rules benefitted from the fact that (i) Austrian law explicitly 
provided for the possibility of a contracting authority to purchase from a CPB located in another 
Member State, and that (ii) under Luxemburgish law, contracting authorities may purchase 
works, supplies and/or services from or through a CPB and cooperate by launching a common 
procurement or by forming a new legal entity.  
It is not possible to assess if similar possibilities existed under the procurement laws of the 
remaining participating Member States, or if any more general restrictions on international 
cooperation for cross-border procurement (including the need to use official languages of each 
Member State) may have been deactivated or substituted by the system created by Decision 
ECB/2008/17. It is also not assessed whether the special status that central banks usually enjoy 
in terms of operational and budgetary autonomy may have also played a significant role, or the 
extent to which this structure could be replicated more generally for non-central bank entities.  
                                                          
16 For background, see http://www.epco.lu/, last accessed 29.03.2017. 
17 Decision ECB/2008/17 of the European Central Bank of 17 November 2008 laying down the framework 
for joint Eurosystem procurement [2008] OJ L 319/76. 
18 Decision ECB/2015/51 of the European Central Bank of 23 December 2015 amending Decision 
ECB/2008/17 laying down the framework for joint Eurosystem procurement [2016] OJ L 6/5. 
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Second, the BBG-SKI study fudges the issue of the subjection of call-off contracts to Dutch 
commercial law. It generally presents the subjection of the framework agreement and all 
subsequent contracts to Dutch law as not creating any problems. However, a closer look may 
indicate more scope for issues and difficulties. Out of the three tenderers invited, “[t]wo 
suppliers did not meet the [tender] requirements, either because they submitted a conditional 
offer or did not agree with the terms of the framework agreement”.19 The report makes no 
attempt to clarify whether these conditions or lack of agreement derived from legal or 
commercial issues, which leaves the question unanswered.  
It also transpires from the BBG-SKI study that these difficulties may have been relevant for at 
least some of the central banks. The report is not too clear on this point when it indicates that 
“[n]ot only the [public procurement] law of the leading bank applied but, for reasons of legal 
coherence, also the contractual law, meaning that the participating banks used Dutch law when 
calling off out of the framework agreement, except when otherwise required by national law. 
In general, the participating banks did not experience difficulties in applying the Dutch 
contractual law, very few of them indicated some general legal restrictions in the use of a 
contract concluded by a contracting authority located in a different Member State, which 
implied that they could not use the joint cross-border agreement in all cases (e.g. limitations 
on the orders to be placed via the joint framework agreement depending on their estimated 
value)”.20  
In my view, this indicates the existence of potential barriers to JCBPP for contracting authorities 
from some Member States, and this would have merited much more detailed analysis. In 
particular, a more in depth assessment would be needed to clarify whether the difficulties 
amounted to what those contracting authorities considered “mandatory public law provisions 
in conformity with Union law to which they are subject in their Member State”, which would 
continue to exclude them from possible participation even after the entry into force of Directive 
2014/24 (see Art 39(1) in fine). 
Overall, then, it is a shame that the BBG-SKI study did not make a better job of the analysis of 
the EPCO case study. Given EPCO’s extensive experience in JCBPP, it seems that this superficial 
analysis of only one of their procurement exercises is a missed opportunity to gain a better 
insight into the effective legal structures that have been used to date. 
 
3.2. The HAPPI Case Study 
This case study analyses a JCBPP exercise between five CPBs based in different Member States 
and specialising in the healthcare sector, which tendered five single-supplier framework 
agreements for innovative products and services linked with ageing and well-being needs. The 
French CPB acted as lead procurer and the framework agreements were tendered under French 
law, and carried out in French, English and Italian. Any disputes arising from the tender process 
were subjected to the jurisdiction of the competent French courts (Paris). It was an explicit 
requirement of the tender documentation that each “contracting authority was able to award 
subsequent contracts on the basis of the framework agreement concluded and executed them 
according to the respective national legislation”; consequently, “[t]he competent instances for 
complaints arising from the award of subsequent contracts [were] the respective national review 
                                                          
19 BBG-SKI study, 28-29. 
20 BBG-SKI study, 27, emphasis added. 
8 
institutions”.21 The participating CPBs decided to act as wholesalers, so there would be no direct 
contractual relationship between end user entities and suppliers. 
The structure of the procurement can be represented as follows: 
 
 
Note that there were four separate framework agreements, one for each of the lots. 
 
3.2.1. Legal framework dimension 
Given the absence of EU-level rules applicable to the collaboration between the CPBs (Art 39 Dir 
2014/24 was not in force), and the absence of an international treaty governing their 
relationship, the participating CPBs opted to address the need to provide an umbrella 
(international) public law framework by creating a European purchasing group instrumented as 
a “groupement de commande” under French law.  
Even if the BBG-SKI study raises no issues with this legal structure—but rather relies heavily on 
the trust that the legal assessments underpinning it were correct—I have serious doubts about 
the legal soundness of the structure and, more importantly, its replicability and scalability. It is 
not clear to me that CPBs in other EU Member States can, without more, enter into an 
agreement to create a ‘European purchasing group’ under French law. I have doubts around 
their international legal personality, their competence and power to enter into international 
agreements, and about the public law controls that (should) apply to such a decision.  
The BBG-SKI study does not clarify the legal status of the participating CPBs under their 
respective legal orders (some are described as non-profit entities, whereas others seem to have 
corporate form). My impression is that all of the CPBs participating in the HAPPI project adopted 
private law institutional or corporate form and that they entered into this ‘European purchasing 
group’ agreement without many (or any, public law) checks on their competence to do so. The 
                                                          
21 BBG-SKI study, 38. 
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content of the agreement is not explained in any detail, and the extent to which disputes 
between the partner-CPBs would actually be subjected to French law and decided by the French 
courts (solely, or at all) is not clear to me. 
3.2.2. Public procurement dimension 
The tender seemed to be structured on the common understanding that the French CPB was 
solely in charge for the procurement, which was thus subjected and limited to French law and 
French remedies mechanisms. 
However, the case study also shows that, given the need to manage multi-lingual tenders, the 
lead procurer did not assume sole responsibility for evaluation and award, but rather “each of 
the partners analysed the offer received in its own language and wrote the conclusion of the 
analysis in English in a common analysis report template”.22 To me, this means that the 
procedure was one where the lead procurer was not consistently and exclusively in charge of 
the procedure (ie there was no possible claim that all other CPBs were buying from the lead 
CPB, or that the lead CPB was exclusively responsible for all phases of the tender); but rather 
one where all CPBs were actually jointly responsible (and potentially liable) for (at least) the 
evaluation and award phases.  
This is hard to reconcile with the rules in Art 39(4) Dir 2014/24—particularly in view of the 
limited detail the BBG-SKI study offers on the content of the agreements underpinning the 
“groupement de commande” under French law—and raises untested issues about potential 
remedies, which can be quite complicated because the administrative law applicable to each of 
these evaluations by the partner-CPBs can hardly be simply assumed to be French law. 
The BBG-SKI study does not address other important issues, such as the potential challenge of 
the variability of law applicable to each call-off (particularly at pre-award stage if a potential 
tenderer challenged this contractual requirement, but also later, during execution and on the 
basis of commercial considerations); or the difficult interaction between the rules controlling 
the framework agreement and those controlling each call-off, particularly in view of the fact 
that there are no mini-competitions and, consequently, call-offs from the single supplier are 
regulated by both French law and the law of the relevant CPB. The extent to which review bodies 
and courts in each of the Member States (other than France) would be willing and able to apply 
French law in conjunction with their domestic rules is simply untested. 
3.2.3. Contractual dimension 
As mentioned above, the tender documentation was designed so that each “contracting 
authority was able to award subsequent contracts on the basis of the framework agreement 
concluded and executed them according to the respective national legislation”. In that regard, it 
is also important to stress that participating CPBs decided to act as wholesalers, which also 
creates significant peculiarities from a contractual perspective because they all hold direct 
contractual relationships with the suppliers within the frameworks and because every final user 
institution calling-off within the legal structure will actually be buying from its domestic CPB, 
which insulates them from cross-border disputes. Therefore, the legal structure is 
fundamentally geared towards trying to minimise the existence of cross-border issues and 
                                                          
22 BBG-SKI study, 40. 
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conflict of law difficulties through the establishment of specific clauses in the framework 
agreements (and each of the CPB call-off contracts). 
Moreover, there seems to be an assumption that all these issues can be satisfactorily addressed 
by contract, and the BBG-SKI study stresses that “[a]s the procurement law applicable to the 
tender was the French law and the call-offs were made under the respective national legislations, 
it was necessary to specify in the tender documents all the relevant details referring to the 
national requirements for subsequent contracts. The tender documents included details on 
rules for the execution of the contract in each of the participating countries, e.g. provisions on 
the form of subsequent contracts, terms of delivery, invoicing, etc. Each call-off from the contract 
was conducted on an individual basis by the contracting authorities or the institutions they were 
representing”.23  
This begs the question whether the entirety of the rules applicable in a given legal order can 
actually be condensed in the tender documents or contract, as well as how issues of legal 
reform, evolution in case law or (more importantly) errors in the way the procurement rules are 
detailed in the tender documentation would be addressed. It is also highly impractical and it 
probably only happened in this case because the project was sponsored by the European 
Commission, which “support offered to the project was a co-financing of 95% of administrative 
costs … and 20% financing of the product costs”.24 
Indeed, it is worth stressing that this case study concentrates on an initiative of innovative cross-
border procurement that was heavily sponsored with EU funds and, as such, does not seem to 
reflect real incentives or needs for the goods and services tendered. Bearing in mind that there 
was a very significant EU-wide communication campaign and market investigation phase that 
ultimately resulted in a total of only 8 tenders (one of them non-compliant) for only 4 of the 5 
lots/framework agreements in which the procurement was divided, and limited call-offs for 
around €250,000 overall, this raises significant issues as to its (commercial) viability. 
 
3.3. The Citrix Case Study 
This is another case study on the procurement of standard software solutions, and shows some 
common technical aspects with the EPCO case study. However, the legal structure is significantly 
simpler, as it only involved a limited number of participating CPBs. It concentrates on the 
cooperation between the Austrian CPB (BBG) and the Danish CPB (SKI) [coincidentally, the 
authors of the study] for the acquisition of standard Citrix software. The procurement was 
instrumented through a framework agreement with three economic operators tendered under 
Austrian law in English. This subjected the tender for the framework agreement to the 
jurisdiction of the Austrian Administrative Court. However, Austrian procurement law did not 
apply to the entirety of the procurement and mini-tenders and direct call-offs were to be carried 
under respective national law of the relevant entity (ie either Austrian or Danish law). This 
presumably subjected these decisions to the respective remedies’ rules in each jurisdiction. The 
contractual law of the respective country of contract implementation would also be applicable 
and, for individual contracts, the appropriate court in Vienna or Copenhagen would be 
competent. 
                                                          
23 BBG-SKI study, 39, emphasis added. 
24 BBG-SKI study, 43. 
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The structure of the procurement can be represented as follows: 
 
 
(*) It is not clear from the BBG-SKI study to which law this ‘cooperation agreement’ was subjected, although 
it probably was Danish law because SKI mandated BBG. 
(**) The framework allowed for direct call-offs of up to €50,000 to the cheapest bidder 
and required mini-competitions for higher value call-offs.  
Please note that direct call-offs by contracting authorities are possible under the scheme.  
These are however not represented to avoid unnecessary graphical complication. 
 
3.3.1. Legal framework dimension 
At the outset of the analysis of the (international) public law constraints in this case, it is 
important to stress that the project started as a three-part collaboration between the Austrian, 
Danish and Finnish CPB. However, the Finnish CPB (Hansel) was forced to withdraw due to 
domestic legal restrictions. 
It is interesting to highlight that, as spelled out in the BBG-SKI study: “the Finnish CPB was not 
able to participate in the JCBPP. The restriction means both that it is impossible for Finnish 
contracting authorities to purchase using the public procurement law of another [Member 
State], and at the same time it is the legal limitation of the Finnish CPB which explicitly allows 
them to purchase only for or on behalf of domestic contracting authorities. Given this problem, 
the project team could not identify any measure to overcome this challenge”.25 Given the 
possibility that similar (constitutional) restrictions apply in other Member States, more details 
on this point would have been very important in connection with the future interpretation of 
Art 39(1) Dir 2014/24. At any rate, though, this is already a very clear indicator of the existence 
of an absolute barrier to JCBPP (which may or may not have been removed by the transposition 
of Dir 2014/24 in Finland) which requires further research. 
The remainder of the case study concentrates on the cooperation between the Austrian and the 
Danish CPB (BBG and SKI respectively), which joint procurement was nested under a private law 
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cooperation agreement—whereby “SKI mandated BBG to conclude the framework agreement 
on its behalf”,26 presumably under Danish private/commercial law. However, this aspect is not 
analysed in any detail and it is difficult to assess the extent to which resort to such private law 
mechanisms is in compliance with applicable Danish (and Austrian) law generally. There is also 
no indication of the dispute resolution mechanisms foreseen in that agreement, and the way it 
may (or not) have created issues of conflict of jurisdiction. 
3.3.2. Public procurement dimension 
The procurement was instrumented through a multi-supplier framework agreement tendered 
under Austrian law in English, as there “was no legal restriction in Austrian or Danish 
procurement law on using English as the main tender language”.27  
The subjection of the tender to Austrian law is an interesting choice because, as the BBG-SKI 
study explains, “[a]lthough the Austrian PP law provided for the possibility of a domestic 
contracting authority to purchase goods and services from a CPB located in another Member 
State and it would have been easier to apply this rule, BBG and SKI decided to conduct the 
procedure based on the possibilities offered in the new directive, namely in a joint cross border 
manner, with BBG acting as lead buyer and to apply Austrian PP law to the tender procedure”.28 
However, it is important to note that “Danish law did not provide for any restrictions on using 
Austrian procurement law for the award of the contract. At the same time, Austrian law did not 
explicitly prohibit BBG from awarding a contract on behalf of contracting authorities from 
another Member State”.29 This limits the possibility of extracting general conclusions applicable 
to Member States where such characteristics are not present. 
It is also important to highlight some particularities of the way in which the procurement was 
carried out. Despite being formally led by BBG, the implementation of the project raises issues 
about the exclusivity of the functions undertaken by the lead procurer. In particular, it is worth 
noting that—similar to the HAPPI case study (above 3.2)—in this case “[t]he tenders were 
evaluated by both CPBs” and “[t]he award was signed by BBG on behalf of SKI but the decision 
to award the contract to the three economic operators was taken by both organisations 
together”30—which, once again, blurs the distinction of functions that cooperating CPBs tried to 
introduce in terms of lead/responsibility for the procurement.  
It is not at all clear to me that, legally, it is true that the structure “automatically put BBG in the 
position of the lead partner”,31 as both CPBs jointly made the most important decisions in the 
procurement process. This is relevant, particularly in terms of potential remedies, and the 
assumption that only Austrian law operates and only Austrian courts are competent does not 
seem straightforward to me—as the activities of SKI could have easily been challenged in 
Denmark under Danish law in as far as it approved the tender documents, evaluated offers and 
signed the award proposal.32 Similar issues arise concerning the call-offs and the interaction 
between the tender documentation for the framework and the direct call-offs, as well as the 
                                                          
26 BBG-SKI study, 56. 
27 BBG-SKI study, 55. 
28 BBG-SKI study, 53. 
29 BBG-SKI study, 59. 
30 BBG-SKI study, 56. 
31 BBG-SKI study, 56. 
32 BBG-SKI study, 57, table 4. 
13 
mini competitions (where applicable), which seem to me more complex than the way in which 
the BBG-SKI study represents them. 
3.3.3. Contractual dimension 
Moreover, it is important to stress that subjection to Austrian law was not extended to the 
entirety of the legal structure. “The applicable contractual law was Austrian for call-offs made 
by Austrian contracting authorities and Danish law for those in Denmark. This approach seemed 
to be the most appropriate one, as using Austrian law for the contractual relationship would 
have been impossible for the Danish contracting authorities and strategically it was important 
for each CPB to offer its customers the legal environment to which they were used”.33 Similarly, 
rules applicable to jurisdictional issues were differentiated for the procurement and the 
execution phase: “[i]n the tender documents it was stated that the competent review body for 
disputes resulting from the tender procedure is the Austrian Federal Administrative Court and 
for legal disputes arising from individual contracts out of the mini-tender, the respective Austrian 
or Danish Court. This formulation was used because the CPBs wanted to avoid dealing with 
Danish court cases in Austria (sic) and vice versa”.34  
It is also interesting to note that, at the end of the procedure, “it turned out that all bidders were 
Austrian companies (distributors and resellers) with Danish subcontractors, which was a strong 
indicator that the Danish market was reluctant about the JCBPP procedure, for reasons which 
are easy to understand”.35 These reasons have probably to do, in large part, with the distribution 
system of Citrix software and the limited competition in that market,36 but it would have been 
interesting to know more about the subcontracting arrangements and the extent to which they 
create additional conflict of law issues where the call-off takes place in Denmark or, on the 
contrary, if this structure could also serve to avoid those issues from the perspective of the 
Austrian main contractors. 
 
3.4. The Brenner Base Tunnel (BTT) Case Study 
This case study concerns the tender for geological tests (a specialised type of construction-
related services) to be carried out in both Austrian and Italian territory. The tender was 
organised as an open procedure to award a contract to a single economic operator (or 
consortium) and it was subjected to Italian public procurement law, using bilingual Italian-
German documents. This subjected any litigation concerning the tender process to the 
jurisdiction of Italian courts. From a choice of law perspective, the contract was functionally split 
in two parts in that it “was managed under Austrian law for the services provided by the supplier 
in Austria and under Italian law for those provided in Italy”.37 This was specified in the tender 
documents, which “provided for a very clear distinction between the works which needed to be 
executed in each of the countries. This was something the contracting authority considered to 
be extremely important in order for the bidders to understand exactly which services needed to 
be implemented in each country”. As a consequence, “disputes arising from the execution of the 
                                                          
33 BBG-SKI study, 59, emphasis added. 
34 BBG-SKI study, 59, emphasis added. 
35 BBG-SKI study, 56. 
36 BBG-SKI study, 49-53. 
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contract in Austria fall under the responsibility of the Court in Innsbruck, while those related to 
the execution in Italy of the Court in Bolzano”.38 
The structure of the procurement can be represented as follows: 
 
 
3.4.1. Legal framework and public procurement dimensions 
This case study concerns the procurement activities of the Brenner Base Tunnel SE (BBT), which 
is the entity in charge of the development of a railway tunnel connecting Austria and Italy 
created by an international treaty. It is a case of JCBPP through a joint entity that squarely fits 
within Art 57(5) of Dir 2014/25 [equivalent to Art 39(5) Dir 2014/24] and, as such, it triggers very 
different issues than those presented above because it does not require the same type of choice 
of law issues.  
This derives from the fact that, as a general rule, the choice of law to which the procurement of 
the joint entity is subjected is already made – in this case, since 2015, the procurement carried 
out by BBT is subject to an asymmetric rule: “cross-border tenders as well as tenders for activities 
carried out in Italy … fall under Italian procurement law whereas tenders for activities carried 
out in Austria [are subject] to the Austrian procurement legislation”.39 As such, and provided 
projects of cross-border nature can be easily identified, this should not create complications due 
to the existence of this EU level system resulting from the joint regulation in an International 
Treaty between Austria and Italy and Dir 2014/25. 
In that regard, it is worth noting that the complexities in the carrying out of cross-border 
procurement that the case study shows—notably, around the difficulties for non-Italian 
tenderers to meet qualitative selection requirements and unduly restrictive pricing and 
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budgetary rules—are, in my view, a result of inherent defects in Italian public procurement 
regulation, rather than a result of the cross-border nature of that specific procurement.  
The analysis seems rather shallow and possibly defective in that the case study ignores the very 
relevant competition distortions that derived from the use of price-only as the award criterion 
coupled with the strictures of Italian law mandating the tender to be based on an ex catalogue 
estimated price/budget. Similarly to the HAPPI case (above 3.2), it is difficult to see how this can 
be touted as a successful case, particularly in view of the obvious de facto exclusion of non-
Italian bidders. In my view, some of these defects could have been successfully challenged as 
contrary to the EU public procurement rules and their underpinning principle of competition 
(but that exceeds the scope of this discussion). 
3.4.2. Contractual dimension 
In my view, this case study offers limited insights, in particular because the BBG-SKI study 
provides very limited details surrounding the contractual structure underpinning the functional 
split according to the place of provision of services—which could raise questions as to whether 
this is a single contract subject to two different legal regimes, or if the award is of two 
interconnected but independent contracts. In any case, this seems something that can be 
subjected to negotiation and contractual agreement under Italian and Austrian law as a 
pragmatic solution to ensure compliance with site-specific regulations (in particular on health 
and safety), which is a very idiosyncratic issue.  
 
4. Some Legal Barriers and Challenges for Legally-Compliant JCBPP 
The reorganisation of the information provided by the BBG-SKI study along the lines of the three 
analytical dimensions outlined above (2) allows for a structured analysis of some of the legal 
barriers and challenges for legally-compliant JCBPP that, in my view, the study fails to critically 
assess. 
 
4.1 Legal framework dimension 
The BBG-SKI study stresses that “[s]etting up an agreement between the contracting authorities 
involved seems to be a very important factor in the cooperation process as the delegation of the 
procurement processes of one institution to another is a sensitive issue for most contracting 
authorities. A clear mandate and clarification from the beginning on the roles of each party and 
the responsibility of the contracting authority are therefore essential”.40 However, despite this 
importance, the study simply indicates that “one basic issue is that national laws restricted in 
different ways the activities of national CAs in their relationship with foreign [contracting 
entities] and/or CPBs”,41 without much more. This issue would have required e in-depth analysis. 
In my view, the four case studies pertain to two very different categories. First, there are cases 
where the (international) public law issues are resolved through the existence of an 
international treaty (BBT) or an EU-level specific legal framework (EPCO). These do not create 
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difficulties once the legal framework is in place,42 but it must be acknowledged that these 
instruments will hardly become the standard framework for JCBPP. 
Second, there are cases where the relevant entities (all of them CPBs, in the case studies that 
fall under this category) opt to ‘escape’ the public law framework that would otherwise (likely) 
apply to their activities, and thus eg opt for the use of mechanisms based on either the domestic 
public law of a different Member State (HAPPI) or private law (Citrix, concerning SKI’s mandate 
to BBG) in a way that is not legally assessed in the study.  
Taking the HAPPI case study, there is simply a statement to the effect that “the partners in the 
consortium could benefit from the fact that the respective Member States did not oblige their 
CPBs only to apply their respective domestic procurement law”.43 However, there is no evidence 
that the use of the French domestic institution of the “groupement de commande” to create 
the European purchasing group was (technically) either possible under French law, or under the 
relevant public laws of the other Member States in which the participating CPBs are based. This 
lack of assessment does not suggest that the use of these structures was necessarily illegal, but 
it does seem to involve legal risks that are unexplored in the BBG-SKI study.  
Similarly, regarding the Citrix case study, there is no analysis of the possibility for the Danish and 
Austrian CPBs to simply enter a private internal cooperation contract. Given the difficulties faced 
by the Finnish CPB in that project, it is plausible to think that both the Danish and Austrian CPBs 
checked these issues before going forward. However, it is also possible that the project may 
have been undertaken despite the existence of significant legal risks for commercial reasons. 
 
4.2. Public procurement dimension 
The BBG-SKI study indicates that “[t]he difficulties arising mostly trace back to conflicts of 
national public procurement regulations including questions of applicability as regards legal 
remedies. They may furthermore also be owed to uncertainties relating to the relevance of other 
legal requirements stemming from national law, such as constitutional and/or administrative 
law restraints, and due to needs for clarification as to the substantial contract law”.44 In my view, 
it is not clear that all case studies managed to exclude (or even minimise) these risks and 
effectively subject the respective tenders to one and only one domestic regime, either 
substantively or in terms of procurement remedies.  
Where contracting entities collaborate in crucial phases of the tender (notably, the evaluation 
of tenders and the award of the contract, such as in the HAPPI and Citrix cases), it would be 
difficult to insulate the non-lead entity from domestic claims under domestic law. Similarly, in 
those cases where the procurement is instrumented by a framework agreement under the law 
of a Member State but the call-offs are carried out in accordance with the law of another 
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Member State (again, as in the HAPPI and Citrix cases), a watertight distinction of legal regimes 
(both substantive and remedial) is also hard to accept. 
Given that channelling the tender exclusively through a standard procurement procedure 
carried out (exclusively) by a single (lead) CPB is difficult—and, thus, a system that hybridises 
paras 2 & 3 with para 4 or with 5 of Art 39 Dir 2014/24 seems to be the practical approach 
followed (to some or other extent) in all case studies involving more than one contracting entity 
(ie to the exception of the BTT case)—this creates uncertainty as to the distinction between the 
models of JCBPP sketched in Art 39 Dir 2014/24 and raises important issues surrounding the 
need for more detailed procedural rules (or, at the very least, guidance) in the absence of an 
EU-level legal framework (such as in the case of EPCO). 
 
4.3. Contractual dimension 
All case studies—with the only possible exception of EPCO’s, although this is not too clear from 
the BBG-SKI study—show a very strong need, or at least preference, for contracting authorities 
to have their domestic law apply to contract execution. This can be problematic because legal 
structures are complicated where bidders have to accept asymmetrical choice of law conditions 
as part of the tender documentation, and it also raises tender costs by imposing additional 
transparency requirements concerned with the law applicable to the contract during execution.  
Moreover, this disconnect between public procurement and contract laws can create particular 
difficulties in countries that have differentiated public contract law regimes—as opposed to 
subjecting them to general (private) contract law. It can also trigger other legal risks, for example 
where there is an unavoidable interaction of pre-award and post-award documentation and 
requirements, such as call-offs without mini-competition within framework agreements, which 
are by definition regulated by the basic conditions set at award of the framework (under the 
procurement law of a Member State) and the specific conditions fine tuned in the call-off and 
subsequent contract (under the law of a different Member State). 
 
4.4. Some additional issues and challenges 
Finally, from a different perspective, it may also be worth stressing that, in the case studies 
covered in the BBG-SKI study, tenders tended to take place in markets that have very peculiar 
competitive structures,45 such as the market for standard software packages—where there are 
issues of limited competition in the supply side—or the market for innovative well-being 
solutions—where there was significant uncertainty as to the existence of sufficient (or any) 
supply, and as evidenced eg by the very limited participation in the HAPPI, Citrix and EPCO 
projects. In part, some of these projects (in particular the Citrix case) were driven by commercial 
considerations that may have trumped concerns around legal risks.46 A detailed competition law 
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assessment may also have been warranted in the Citrix case, as the compliance of BBG-SKI’s 
behaviour with competition law may be called into question.47  
On its part, the BBT case is itself a clear example of a procurement-created distortion of market 
competition due to mandatory Italian indicative price requirements and restrictive qualitative 
selection criteria, which in my view demonstrates a case of procurement failure rather than a 
success. Overall, the peculiarities of these markets and/or specific tenders make it difficult to 
assess the extent to which the case studies are representative of the feasibility of JCBPP in more 
competitive (commodities) markets, which can also carry higher risks of legal challenge. 
 
5. Conclusion and Normative Recommendation 
This paper has shown how, under a more structured and critical analysis than that carried out 
in the BBG-SKI study (which is shallow and, on many an occasion, rather naïve), the significant 
legal difficulties and challenges implied in JCBPP projects such as the four case studies discussed 
therein remain fundamentally unadressed. There are few common elements in terms of the 
legal solutions adopted, beyond a hint towards a tendency to design the tenders in a way that 
avoids the emergence of trans-EU public law by fragmenting and re-localising different phases 
of JCBPP—though not always in a way that necessarily or unquestionably ensures the success 
of this strategy. 
In my view, a number of open and complex questions remain unanswered in the three analytical 
dimensions of the (international) public law framework for these collaborations, conflicts of 
public procurement laws (both substantive and remedial) regarding the JCBPP tender, and 
conflicts of private (and public) law applicable to the ultimate contractual relationships. 
Despite the factually-interesting discussion of the (mostly) commercially successful case studies 
covered in the BBG-SKI study, it does not shed any substantial light on key issues of legal 
compliance and on the way in which Member States can transpose and develop the rules of Arts 
37 to 39 Dir 2014/24 (and their equivalents in Dir 2014/25). It also does not provide a sufficiently 
representative mapping of challenges and potential solutions as to make it possible to devise 
models of legal structure that can work under the general constraints of the legal systems of 
Member States with different levels of public law checks and balances over the activities of their 
contracting entities and, in particular, their CPBs.  
It seems clear to me that much more detailed and careful legal research is needed in this area, 
and that the European Commission should facilitate such more detailed research with a view to 
the adoption of future guidance on the rules applicable to JCBPP under the 2014 EU Public 
Procurement Directives. I would suggest that a comparative law project based on the analytical 
blueprint developed here and in previous contributions is a promising possibility. 
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